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## Practice mind-ed orders

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This essay defends two principal theses: (1) that social order is established within the sway of social practices, and (2) that mind is a central dimension of this 'process.' The first claim is a large one and cannot be fully substantiated here. It primarily serves as a context for developing the second thesis. The path to the latter end, moreover, leads through an analysis of the organization of practices. It is the role that a socially constituted mind plays in structuring practices that certifies practices as the place of social order.

### Social order(s)

Building on Talcott Parsons's distinction between factual and normative order, Dennis Wrong (1994) has recently distinguished two problems of order. One, the 'mere' cognitive problem of order, concerns the formation and maintenance of stable, regular, and predictable patterns of behavior. The second, genuine problem of order asks what holds society together, that is, what ensures relatively stable, nonovertly violent human coexistence. This second problem, which Parsons dubbed the 'Hobbesian Problem of Order,' is certainly an important issue. Wrong infelicitously underplays, however, the sort of phenomenon to which the first problem calls attention. For practical solutions to the Hobbesian problem implicate establishment of a deeper type of order, one on a par with, though different from, the ones Wrong builds into the definition of the cognitive problem. This seems true even according to his own position, since nonviolent human coexistence likely requires at least some behavioral regularity.

Should, however, cognitive, or in Parsons's terms 'factual,' order be tied to regularity? Like many thinkers, Wrong assumes that factual order—the disposition and hanging together of entities—is the same as regularity. I suspect he thinks this on the grounds that scientific cognition, if not human cognition generally, proceeds by grasping regularities. In recent decades, however, the assimilation of order and cognition to regularity and its apprehension has come under suspicion. Wittgenstein's (1958: sections 65– 79) remarks on family resemblances, like Derrida's (e.g., 1988a) reflections on sameness over difference, exemplify considerations that show that order *per se* cannot be identified with regularity *qua* repetition of the same. Recall Wittgenstein's

example: a variety of different activities count as games, and in this sense compose an order, even though what in the world corresponds to this state of order is not the uniform repetition of specific features, but a tangle of samenesses and similarities among the activities involved. Observations such as this suggest that there is more both to the ordering of things and to cognition (including scientific cognition) than regularities and their apprehension.

Wittgenstein's remarks, like those of Derrida and also Foucault (1972) and Kuhn (1977), do not just reveal the inadequacy of the widespread equation of order with regularity. They also disclose the elaborate tangle of resemblance and difference that characterizes the phenomena falling under any given concept of natural language. Their discernment of dispersion at the alleged place of regularity thus suggests that a viable conception of order must accommodate manifolds of variably similar and divergent entities as ordered phenomena. Now, one conception of order that does this while also building upon the complex and variable connections that exist among things, construes order as *arrangements*. An arrangement is a layout of entities in which they relate and take up places with respect to one another. On the basis of this intuitive conception, *social* order can be defined as arrangements of people and the organisms, artifacts, and things through which they coexist. An example is an arrangement of teacher, students, desks, chalkboard, plants, and seeing eye dog in a classroom. In this arrangement, the cited entities relate spatially, causally, intentionally (via mental states), and prefiguratively (roughly, by enabling and constraining one another's activities). They thereby take up positions with regard to one another that combine aspects of these four dimensions. As elements of the arrangement, these entities also possess identities (who someone is) or meanings (what something is). For something's meaning/identity is a function of its relations, just as conversely its relations are a function of its meaning/identity. Teachers, for example, face and lecture to students because of who they all are, just as who they are depends on this orientation and activity. Incidentally, I do not claim that the conception of social order as arrangements is the only definition that both declines to assimilate order to regularity and does justice to dispersion and interconnectedness! In the present context, however, I will not defend it against alternatives.

I tie meaning and identity to social order and focus on them in later remarks because meaning and identity do stand for being. To proclaim the interrelated meanings and identities of arranged items a key component of social order is to declare being central to order. It is to acknowledge, first, that there are no arrangements that are not arrangements of somethings and, second, that social somethings, perhaps somethings in general, *are* somethings as parts of arrangements. This latter thesis does not allege that being derives solely from positionality in arrangements. As will be discussed, being also springs from contexts in which arrangements exist. This thesis simply avers that people (and some organisms) possess identities, and that artifacts, things, organisms, and people bear meanings, as elements of arrangements. To use a familiar

Heideggerian example: hammers and nails are tools with which (*inter alia*) to pound and fasten—relative to one another, as part of a nexus of equipment for building and repairing, and in relation to humans who use or know how to use them thus in carrying out building and repair activities. What is more, people perform acts of hammering, prying, gauging, measuring, and so on, and acquire such identities as handymen, Sunday bumblers, and skilled carpenters, both through their use of such tools when repairing and building things and through relations with other people within these and further family, recreational, and employment activities.

Congruent with the widespread attention lavished in the past century on meaning *qua* founding dimension of social existence, a variety of contemporary thinkers have focused on the order-meaning-being axis in discussing social order (though their texts often do not mention order by name). The following two examples help prepare the ground for the discussion of practices in the second and third sections. In *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (1985: Chapter 3), Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe define discourses as totalities of systematically and interrelatedly meaningful actions, words, and things.<sup>1</sup> As an example, they cite the builder and assistant example from the second paragraph of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. The discourse described in this paragraph is composed of a variety of building stones, a limited repertoire of words that, for example, designate these stones, and the actions of calling for and bringing stones. Laclau and Mouffe use the word 'positions' to designate the meanings involved in a discourse or, more accurately, entities *qua* bearers of these meanings. Examples of the positions in the building discourse are slab, pillar, the word 'slab,' and calling for a slab (as opposed to the hunks of granite, sounds, and bodily movements that bear these meanings). Positions are defined, moreover, through their differences from one another: for example, blocks are blocks because of their differences from pillars, slabs, beams, and the words as well as actions that pertain to them. Positions also constitute being: what entities are. A discourse is thus a structured totality of systematically related, being-articulating positions, something highly similar to a social order as defined above.

Similarly, in 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man' (1985) Charles Taylor pronounces semantic spaces a central feature of the social. A semantic space embraces three fields of meaning, one each for (1) people's states of being (e.g., their desires, feelings, emotions), (2) the situations they confront (thus the people, events, and things with which they deal) and (3) their behavior in those situations. According to Taylor, to say that an item of one of these three sorts (states of being, situation, behavior) occurs in a field of meaning is to say that it has meaning only in relation to the meanings of other items in that field. For example, deferential behavior is deferential only in relation to respectful, cringing, ironic, insolent, provocative, and rude, etc., behavior. What is more, the three fields of meaning that make up a semantic space are interwoven. That a situation is shameful, for example, hangs together with people both feeling

shame and going on in certain ways in it. Indeed, the three fields are really one, for meaning is tied to language: the meanings that items of the above sorts can have for a group of people are the meanings marked by the vocabulary these people use to describe themselves and their situations. A group's states, situations, and behaviors thus form a web that is woven together by a set of linguistically marked meanings. Like Laclau and Mouffe, furthermore, Taylor connects meaning to being, in part by contending that a group's semantic spaces help constitute the social reality in and through which it lives. These spaces of meaning also subtend social orders *qua* meaning-imbued arrangements. For a consequence of living in and through these spaces is that actors, along with the entities through and to which they relate, form arrangements of interconnectedly meaningful beings.

### Setting up the argument

One of the claims this essay advances is that social order is instituted within practices. Although neither Taylor nor Laclau and Mouffe speak specifically of social orders, their semantic spaces and discourses are closely connected to practice. Examining these connections identifies several aspects of practice pertinent to the establishment of order.

Whereas discourses for Laclau and Mouffe are structured totalities of meaningful entities, practice—if I understand them right—is movement and change. Discourse, in other words, is being, while practice is the becoming from which discourses result and to which they eventually succumb. Conversely, discourses are the precarious fixities that precipitate from human practice and from which further practice arises. The latter formulation is preferable in Laclau and Mouffe's eyes because practice has form (being) only in so far as it issues from extant discourse. Erupting from a discourse that imparts to it form, practice dislocates existing positions (meanings) by rearticulating them, thereby establishing transformed discourses. Consider the discourse composed of building stones along with words and actions that pertain to them. Although Wittgenstein does not mention what Laclau and Mouffe call practice in specifying his example, the practice connected to this discourse would be, first, the activity from which the discourse arose in the past and, second, any future activity that rearticulated its arrangement of stones, words, and actions. An example would be the assistant seizing a slab as a weapon and attacking the builder. Laclau and Mouffe maintain, further, that no position is ever secure: recent and enduring fixations of meaning alike are always susceptible to dislocation through practice. Indeed, any entity can bear indefinitely many meanings and enter indefinitely many discourses. Laclau and Mouffe dub the overflow of signification beyond any partial fixation the 'field of discursivity' and in some passages identify this field as the place of the social.

For Taylor, by contrast, practices are not simply becoming (activity), but in addition a site, or context, where activity occurs. This is because practices

house the semantic spaces discussed above. Consider Taylor's example, negotiation practices. Negotiation practices carry a range of meanings for behaviors, states, and situations. This space is marked by the language used within it, thus by expressions such as 'entering into negotiations,' 'bargaining in good faith,' 'hoping to reach an agreement,' 'wanting to realize one's maximal demands,' 'time to make a counteroffer,' and so on. Particular acts of entering into negotiation and bargaining in good faith, etc., are moments of the practice; and their meanings as such acts are drawn from the practice's semantic space. Like Laclau and Mouffe, consequently, Taylor believes that human activity has form *qua* embodiment of meaning. Contrary to their account, however, (1) the meaning of an action does not derive from its differences from other elements of a specific order and (2) practice is not a particular—and rare—form of activity that dislocates meaning by reestablishing it. Rather, human activity is meaningful as an instantiation of meanings that are carried in semantic spaces; and practices are open-ended sets of action that carry such spaces. Thus, whereas Laclau and Mouffe treat practice as order-transforming activity and tie meaning to concrete orders, Taylor views practices as the site where human activity occurs and ties meaning to an abstract dimension of them.

Both Taylor and the Laclau/Mouffe team pinpoint key features of practices that are pertinent to their forming the context of social order. Laclau and Mouffe emphasize practice as activity. Moreover, in attributing the transformation of discourses to practice, they declare human activity causally responsible for social orders (as suggested by their references to 'social forces' that transform discourses). Taylor, meanwhile, highlights practices as site and not just as activity: Practices are contexts where actions are carried out. He suggests, further, that the meanings that are instantiated in the arrangements established within a given practice are drawn from the possibilities contained in the practice's semantic space. He thereby links the establishment of social order to abstract contexts. Taylor also, finally, anchors a practice's semantic space in the distinctions marked by the language used in it. For Taylor, as for many contemporary theorists, language is an essential constitutive dimension of social reality—and also of practices and social orders as a result.

I agree with Laclau and Mouffe that practices are human activity and that causality in social affairs is centered in such activity. (Artifacts, organisms, and things also make a contribution, though I will not consider this further.) But I also think Taylor is right that practices are the chief context of human activity—and of social orders. I will substantiate this thesis in two steps. The first is to specify two types of 'determination,' other than the intervention of action in the world, that are pertinent to social orders. This task is carried out in the remainder of the current section. The second step, to be taken in the fourth section, is schematically outlining how practices shape these two types of determination. My overall argument is, thus, that social orders are established within the sway of social practices because practices mold the forms of determination that are

responsible for them. In the third section, meanwhile, I outline an account of practices.

One additional type of determination is the specification of what people do. What I mean is not whatever mechanisms might be causally responsible for the carrying out of bodily doings that constitutes the performance of actions (cf. the discussion of doings and actions in the third section). Rather, I mean the specification of *x*—and not *y* or *z*—as the action a person intentionally and knowingly (seeks to) carry out at a given moment (via his or her bodily doings). The actions that people intend knowingly to perform are those that make sense to them to perform. I call the state of affairs that action makes sense to someone to do ‘practical intelligibility.’ People almost always, I contend, do what makes sense to them to do; more elaborately, they are almost always performing bodily doings that, in the current circumstances, constitute the actions that make sense to them to perform. I should explain that practical intelligibility is not the same as rationality. What makes sense to people to do is, intrinsically, neither what is nor what seems rational to do. Although on many occasions what makes sense coincides with what is or seems rational, on other occasions (such as when one person strikes out at another in anger) what makes sense to someone to do is not what it is rational to do. As will be discussed in the third section, practical intelligibility is determined by the mental phenomena of teleology and affectivity, by orientations toward ends and by how things matter. Both the pursuit of ends and how things matter can divert a person from doing what is rational. Incidentally, in governing activity practical intelligibility specifies the form of human activity. It thus corresponds to Aristotle’s formal cause, whereas the bodily mechanisms that bring about bodily doings correspond to what he called moving causes (or rather, the later interpretation of these as efficient causes). Once the bringing about of social states of affairs is recognized as centering in action, as Laclau and Mouffe (and many others) urge it should be, the governing of action through practical intelligibility becomes relevant to the establishment of order.

The second additional type of determination is the institution of meaning. What institutes meaning is whatever in the realm of intelligibility is responsible for people and things bearing such and such meanings and not others. Plato, for example, identified the something concerned as the Forms, whereas Husserl identified it as transcendental intentionality and many contemporary theorists such as Taylor think language does the trick. Note that the institution of meaning is not simply an issue of possible meanings, *à la* Taylor’s semantic spaces. It is more directly an issue of what establishes, as a matter of intelligibility, that a piece of behavior constitutes such and such an action and not another, that something is a particular object or event and not another, that someone’s identity is such and such and not this and that, in general, that the meanings and identities borne by the components of a particular arrangement are *a*, *b*, and *c* and not *x*, *y*, and *z*. Whereas causality is the bringing about of something that bears a

particular meaning, the institution of meaning is the establishment of the fact *that* it bears that meaning.

As noted, Taylor's notion of semantic spaces suggests that some sort of abstract context is pertinent to meaning. I do not want to follow him further and to anchor the institution of meaning essentially in language, but this is a topic for another essay. The fourth section will, instead, simply identify a feature of practices different from semantic spaces as the abstract phenomenon that institutes meaning. In any event, I can now formulate my argument more precisely: practices form the chief context of social orders by molding action and meaning—that is, by helping to shape the practical intelligibility that governs activity and by carrying that, in accordance with which the meanings of arranged entities are instituted.

### Practices and their mental organization

Practices are organized nexuses of activity. Examples are cooking practices, rearing practices, political practices, farming practices, negotiation practices, banking practices, and recreational practices. Each, as an organized web of activity, exhibits two overall dimensions: activity and organization.

A practice is, first, a *set of actions*. For instance, farming practices comprise such actions as building fences, harvesting grain, herding sheep, judging weather, and paying for supplies. Generally speaking, moreover, the actions that compose a practice are either bodily doings and sayings or actions that these doings and sayings constitute. By 'bodily doings and sayings' I mean actions that people directly perform bodily and not by way of doing something else. (These 'behaviors,' as I label them, are basic actions in the sense Arthur Danto [1965] gave this term.)<sup>2</sup> Examples are hammering, handing over money, turning a steering wheel, running, watching, looking, uttering words, and writing them. Examples of the actions these bodily doings and sayings might constitute are building a house, paying for supplies, making a left turn, hurrying home, whiling away time, checking for faults, ordering someone to stand, and composing a poem. To say that actions are 'constituted' by doings and sayings is to say that the performance of doings and sayings amounts, in the circumstances involved, to the carrying out of actions.

The asseveration that practices embrace activity is truistic. What more is there, however, to a practice than activity? One might propose that actions compose a practice by virtue of causal connections between them. According to this proposal, acts of, for example, negotiation, making an offer, and buying help compose the practice of economic exchange by way of inducing and responding to one another (cf. Habermas's [1987: Chapter 6, Section 2] conception of systems, as opposed to social, integration).! set this suggestion aside for a number of reasons, the most relevant being that causal connections between actions are mediated by what I contend organizes practices, namely, mind. Consider, then, the idea that practices are organized mentally. Stephen Turner (1994) has

recently mounted arguments against this idea and suggested (p. 117) that the only acceptable use of the expression 'practices' is to refer to patterns of behavior. He reaches the latter conclusion in three steps. He first claims that many writers have conceptualized practices as shared, causally effective mental objects such as tacit knowledge and presuppositions (that are hypothesized to lie behind behavior). He next stages arguments against the intelligibility and explanatory power of such shared mental entities. He concludes, finally, that the only thing the term 'practices' can designate is patterns of behavior.

Note first that practices cannot be composed of patterns alone. The actions that make up, say, farming or banking practices are not simply those that form patterns: irregular, ad hoc, and even unique actions can also be elements of the activity manifolds that are farming or banking. More importantly, Turner's arguments against the mental organization of practices simply assume that mental states are causally effective objects. This conception of mentality, however, is not universal. Indeed, it is probably mistaken. Diverse contemporary theories of mind hold that the conditions designated by common locutions of mentality are neither objects nor causal determinants of behavior. Examples include all theories that argue that teleological or reason explanations of action are not causal explanations. (For two recent examples, see Brandom [1994] and Heal [1995].) Another example is the account of mind deriving from Wittgenstein that is utilized in the following.

According to this account,<sup>3</sup> mental phenomena such as desiring, hoping, feeling, believing, expecting, seeing, and being in pain are not states or processes of either an abstract or a real and underlying apparatus. Rather, they are states of one's life: ways things stand or are going for oneself in one's ongoing involvement with the world. For example, desiring chocolate ice cream is chocolate ice cream's being (to oneself) something to possess (cf. Sartre's [1962] analysis of emotions). Similarly, believing *x* is *x*'s being to oneself the case, just as being annoyed is something's annoying one. As these formulations suggest, mental states, instead of being objects or processes, are *states of affairs* that obtain with respect to a person: that such and such is annoying, the case, or something to possess or realize. Such states are how things stand or are going for that person in his or her involvement in the world.

One important feature of mental states so conceived is that they are *expressed* in behavior, where 'expressed' means that behavior manifests or signifies them (as when joy is manifested in crying and belief in God is signified by praying). A second important feature is that these states do not inform activity by causing it. Rather, they inform activity by determining what makes sense to people to do. An end, for instance, can combine with beliefs and emotions to specify a given action as what makes sense to their possessor to do. For instance, receipt of greater parental attention being something to achieve can combine with a brother having received a new train for his birthday and the brother having done a number of annoying things the previous day, to specify breaking the train as the action that now makes sense to a younger brother to perform. (*Ceteris paribus*,



moreover, the younger brother proceeds into action.) I should reiterate that practical intelligibility is not the same as rationality, though the actions singled out as the ones to perform can coincide with those that rationality advocates. If the younger brother believes that he will be punished for destroying his brother's train, smashing it might not be the rational thing to do. His annoyance at the brother's earlier escapades might be such, however, that smashing it is still specified as the action to perform. The dictates of practical intelligibility diverge from those of rationality especially (but not only) when emotions, moods, and hopes help determine what makes sense to people to do.

The upshot of this discussion of mentality is that to attribute mental conditions to someone is not, *pace* Turner, to declare that certain hidden objects caused this and that phenomenal behavior. Rather, it is to articulate how things stood and were going for this person who performed such and such behaviors in these particular circumstances. Mind, consequently, does not comprise such representational entities as tacit knowledge that cause behavior, but instead consists in practical intelligibility-determining states of affairs that are expressed in behavior.

It is not necessary to develop this thumbnail sketch further. The important point is that mind need not be conceptualized as a thing or apparatus that causes behavior. As a result, Turner's arguments against the intelligibility and explanatory potency of shared, causally effective mental objects fail to show that practices cannot be organized, *inter alia*, through mentality. For these arguments pass by all defenses of such an organization that work with a nonsubstantive and noncausal conception of mind. Hence, they fail to refute the possibility that mind is a medium through which the activities that compose a practice are *noncausally* organized.

How, then, does mind organize a set of doings and sayings as a practice? I work toward answering this question by first explaining that a practice is a set of doings and sayings that is organized by a pool of understandings, a set of rules, and something I call a 'teleoaffective structure.'

By 'understandings' I do not mean the sort of practical sensibility that certain prominent practice theorists cite to explain much, if not all human behavior in its finely tuned sensitivity to immediate setting and wider context. Examples of this sort of sensibility are Bourdieu's (1990) habitus (practical sense) and Giddens's (1984) practical consciousness. Bourdieu and Giddens disagree about the range of human activity these sensibilities determine. Whereas Bourdieu maintains that actors' 'sense for the game' determines all human activity, Giddens claims that practical consciousness determines routine actions alone. Uniting them is the intuition, however, that that function of governing human activity which was traditionally assigned to mind can instead be ascribed, generally, to some practical sensibility.

Crediting a practical sensibility with the determination of which actions people always or routinely perform is problematic. To begin with, practical understanding is somewhat nonexplanatory. To say that John x-ed in situation z either because he knows how to go on in z or because he has a 'feel for

the game' played there does not explain why he x-ed. It says only that he is proficient at getting about in situations like z and that this proficiency saw him through once again. In other words, it does not indicate what specifically it was about John and z such that someone who is conversant with z-situations as John is would x; and John's x-ing in z is determined by these uncited features of John and z, not by his knowing how to go on. What is more, knowing how to go on can account for *whatever* John does. It fails, consequently, to explain why he x-ed instead of y-ed, moreover why he did anything at all. Finally, the perfunctoriness of explaining people's actions by repeatedly invoking their habitus or practical consciousness sits uneasily alongside the garden variety fact that people can explain almost all their actions in great detail (which is not to say that their explanations are never wrong). In short, practical sense and practical consciousness lack the multiplicity required for crediting them very often with the determination of which specific actions people carry out.<sup>4</sup>

The understandings that link the actions composing a practice are better construed as abilities that pertain to those actions. One such ability is knowing how to x, where x is one of the practice's constituent actions. By 'knowing how to x' I mean knowing which of the doings and sayings of which one is capable would constitute x-ing in current circumstances. A person knows how to build a fence, for instance, when s/he knows which such behaviors as hammering, lifting a board, eyeing the fence line, and inserting a post into a hole would constitute building a fence in the immediate circumstances. Two other important abilities in this context are knowing how to identify x-ings and knowing how to prompt as well as to respond to x-ings. The actions that compose a given practice, consequently, are linked by the cross-referencing and interdependent know-hows that they express concerning their performance, identification, instigation, and response. The actions that compose farming practices, for example, are linked by expressed abilities to perform, identify, prompt, and respond to acts of herding sheep, judging weather, gathering hay, setting up irrigation, building fences, purchasing supplies, and the like.

Understanding sometimes helps determine what specifically makes sense to people to do. Knowing, for instance, what another person is doing helps determine how to respond to him. Understanding also ubiquitously subtends activity without determining practical intelligibility by enabling an actor behaviorally to carry out the actions that make sense to him to perform. Practical intelligibility, however, is primarily determined, not by understanding, but by rules, teleology, and affectivity. By 'rules' I mean explicit formulations that enjoin or school in particular actions. Such formulations must not be thought of simply as articulations of preexisting understanding. Although some formulations—for instance, rules of grammar—approximate this status, others do not—for instance, those conceived and introduced either to bring about specific actions or to regulate existing activities. Statute law, 'rules of thumb,' and explicit normative enjoinings exemplify what I mean by 'rule.' What people do often reflects formulations of which they are aware. For what makes sense to them to

do often reflects their understanding of (or desire to circumvent, etc.) specific rules. Indeed, practices harbor collections of rules that practitioners (or subsets thereof) are supposed to observe. Farming practices, for instance, embrace different, though overlapping sets of directives and instructions for farmers, hired help, and children. So the actions composing a practice are linked, second, through the collection of rules that they observe; more precisely, through understandings of these rules that they express.

Rules, however, only intermittently and never *simpliciter* determine what people specifically do. A more omnipresent determinant of practical intelligibility is thus called for. I incline toward drawing on Aristotelian-Heideggerian intuitions and identifying this third factor as a mix of teleology and affectivity. Teleology, as noted, is orientations toward ends, while affectivity is how things matter. What makes sense to a person to do largely depends on the matters for the sake of which she is prepared to act, on how she will proceed for the sake of achieving or possessing those matters, and on how things matter to her; thus on her ends, the projects and tasks she will carry out for the sake of those ends given her beliefs, hopes, and expectations, and her emotions and moods. Practical intelligibility is teleologically and affectively determined.

The previous sentence but one suggests, I hope, that the teleological and affective determination of practical intelligibility is in fact a mental determination. The determination of intelligibility by mattering, for instance, is a determination via emotions and moods. Moreover, the specification of how someone will proceed for the sake of certain ends is tied to her beliefs, hopes, and expectations. And what it is for a person to pursue ends and to carry out projects and tasks for the sake of those ends is for the sought-after states of affairs and pursued activities to be objects of her desires, hopes, and intentions. An example should help clarify these claims. In the previous section I described a case in which a child's desire to gain greater parental attention combined with his annoyance at a brother's earlier behavior and his belief that the brother has received a new train for his birthday to specify breaking the train as the action that makes sense to him to perform. In this example, receiving greater parental attention is the child's end, and breaking the train is the action he intends to do, *ceteris paribus*, in fact carries out for the sake of this end, given his belief. His desires, beliefs, and intentions thus house the teleological determination of practical intelligibility. The child's annoyance, meanwhile, is the element of affectivity which also helps determine what makes sense to him to do. In ways such as this, all mental determinations of practical intelligibility can be cashed out teleologically and affectively—and, conversely, all teleological and affective determinations of intelligibility can be cashed out mentally. The two ways of talking are simply overlapping and otherwise congruent discourses for articulating the self-same phenomenon of practical intelligibility.

Taking teleology and affectivity as a clue, the third dimension of the organization of a practice can be specified as a normative 'teleoaffective structure,' a range of acceptable or correct ends, acceptable or

correct tasks to carry out for these ends, acceptable or correct beliefs (etc.) given which specific tasks are carried out for the sake of these ends, and even acceptable or correct emotions out of which to do so. Farming practices, for example, embrace a range of acceptable or correct combinations of such ends as increasing profit, preserving the land, and feeding one's family; such projects as seeding, gathering, and building fences; and such beliefs as that farmland should be burned and that barns should be built in certain forms. Unlike rearing practices, however, farming practices do not reveal much in the way of affectual structuring. The actions composing a practice are thus linked, third, by a teleoaffective structure.

In sum, a practice is a set of doings and sayings organized by a pool of understandings, a set of rules, and a teleoaffective structure. Not just the doings and saying involved, incidentally, but the understandings, rules, and teleoaffectivities that organize them, can change over time in response to contingent events. Of course, practices reveal further 'structural' features, for instance, regularities in and causal connections between their constituent actions, as well as layouts and linkages between the material settings in which they transpire. But it is by virtue of expressing certain understandings, rules, ends, projects, beliefs, and emotions (etc.) that behaviors form an organized manifold. Since, furthermore, the organizing phenomena resolve into mental conditions, mind is a 'medium' through which practices are organized. With this conception of practices and its mental organization in hand, I conclude this essay by returning to the thesis that social order is established within practices.

### **The establishment of order**

Social orders, recall, are arrangements of people and of the artifacts, organisms, and things through which they coexist, in which these entities relate and possess identity and meaning. To say that orders are established within practices is to say that arrangements—their relations, identities, and meanings—are determined there. One crucial aspect of this determination is the bringing about of arrangements through human activity. Another is the institution of the meanings and identities that humans and nonhumans possess as components of arrangements. Both 'processes' depend on the organization of practices. I should mention, by the way, that arrangements are established, not just within individual practices, but also across them. Whereas arrangements within practices rest on the actions and organizations of individual practices, arrangements across them rest on the actions and organizations of different practices. Arrangements are established across practices when, for instance, individuals who are carrying on different practices, say, farming and commercial ones, interact and thus form an arrangement at, say, the general store; or when chains of action pass through different practices, for example, those of farming, commerce, cooking, and state surveillance, and thereby set up arrangements that embrace farmers, shop owners, spouses, and Internal Revenue Service officers.

As Laclau and Mouffe emphasize, social orders are brought about (largely) through human activity. Indeed, human activity brings about most of those interdependencies and sedimentations, the existence of which are marked in expressions for social systems, institutions, and structures, for example, 'economy,' 'state,' and 'kinship.' As discussed, moreover, what people do is governed by what makes sense to them to do. Implicit in my discussion in the previous section is the fact that when people participate in a particular practice their actions express understandings, rules, teleologies, and affectivities that number among those organizing the practice. This means that what makes sense to them to do is determined—at least in part—by these phenomena. For instance, what makes sense to farmers when carrying on farming practices is determined by such ends as increasing profit, preserving the land, and feeding one's family, such tasks as seeding, gathering, and building fences, and such beliefs as that farmland should be burned and that barns should be built in certain forms. Often, however, some of the factors that determine what makes sense to people to do are not contained in the organization of the practice they are currently carrying on. The farmer, for instance, might plant an extra field as a way of impressing the widow who lives across the county. In any event, when people carry on a practice, the organization of the practice is partly responsible for what they do and, thus, for the orders they effect. People, however, are always carrying out this or that practice. Indeed, actions presuppose practices (see Schatzki 1996: Chapter 4, Section 2). It follows that both what people generally do and the orders their activities generally bring about are beholden to practice organization. So practices establish social order, first, because they help mold the practical intelligibility that governs their practitioners' actions and thereby help determine which arrangements people bring about. And to repeat: because understanding, rules (i.e., understandings thereof), and teleoaffectivity are 'mental' phenomena, mind is pivotal to the elaboration of order within practices.

I wrote in the second section that what institutes meaning is whatever in the realm of intelligibility is responsible for entities possessing particular meanings (and not others). As examples of the something concerned, I cited Platonic Forms, Husserlian intentions, and hermeneutic-poststructural languages. According to my Heideggerian-Wittgensteinian intuitions, by contrast, the something concerned is conceptual understandings. For a conceptual understanding of *x* is an understanding of what *x* is; and it is on the background of understandings of what *x*, *y*, and *z*, etc., are that something can be and is a *x*, a *y*, or a *z*. Something can be a barn or a crop, for instance, only given what a barn or a crop are. I contend that the conceptual understandings, given which the elements of arrangements have specific meanings and not others (i.e., given which *what* action-effected arrangements are composed of is *x*, *y*, and *z* and not *a*, *b*, and *c*), are features of practices. So practices are the context of social order, second, in encompassing that which institutes the meanings of arranged entities.

Wittgenstein's texts suggest that understanding the concept of *x* is knowing how to identify *x*'s and to react (appropriately) to the phenomena that qualify as

x's. In other words, conceptual understanding is a know-how. This knowhow is expressed, moreover, in uses and explanations of the expression 'x,' together with actions taken toward the phenomena to which 'x' applies (e.g., Wittgenstein 1967: Section 513; 1980a: Section 910). As discussed in the previous section, the understandings that help organize practices comprise various know-hows, including knowing how to x, knowing how to identify xings, and knowing how to prompt and respond to such acts. Notice that the know-hows that make up conceptual understandings of actions are among those that organize practices. More specifically: conceptual understandings of the actions that compose a practice are contained in the understandings that organize the practice. As noted, for example, farming practices are organized by abilities to perform, identify, prompt, and respond to such acts as herding sheep, judging weather, and gathering hay. In being such, these practices automatically embrace understandings of what these actions are. Moreover, since carrying on practices also involves acting toward and speaking about both the people performing and the things bound up with the practice's actions, practices also carry understandings of the meanings of those humans and nonhumans that are indigenous to the practice and its arrangements (in farming practices: farmers, hired help, barns, crops, crop damage, farm implements, crop dusters, etc.). In short, contained in the understandings that organize a practice are those conceptual understandings, given which the meanings of the entities arranged in the practice are instituted. This is only part of the story, however, about how individual practices institute the meanings of entities within them.

How the meanings of those entities that are scattered among multifarious practices are also instituted in practices, is likewise a further story. This is enough, however, to suggest that the chief context of social order, the place where it is established, is a complex and evolving nexus of interwoven practices.

### Notes

- 1 I acknowledge that the authors would today no longer defend the positions described here.
- 2 A saying, incidentally, is a doing that says something about something.
- 3 For detailed discussion of the topics of the third section, see Schatzki (1996: Chapters 2 and 4).
- 4 These criticisms, I should add, do not apply to Dreyfus's (1991: Chapters 4 and 11) account of skills, at least when this account is expanded to embrace Heidegger's analysis of worldhood. This is because skills, in Dreyfus's Heideggerian hands, possess a teleoaffective *Ausgerichtheit* that sidesteps the problems just identified and renders his account largely compatible with the analysis offered here.